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FAIR.COM?:
AN EXAMINATION OF THE
ALLEGATIONS OF SYSTEMIC
UNFAIRNESS IN THE ICANN UDRP†
Michael Geist∗
“There should be a general parity between the appeal rights of
complainants and d omain name holders.”1
I. INTRODUCTION
In just over two years, the Internet Corporation for Assigned
Names and Numbers’ (“ICANN”) Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (“UDRP”)2 has resolved over 4000 disputes involving almost 8000 domain names.3 With its global
reach, fast turnaround and inexpensive fees, the UDRP is
touted as a shining example of the potential of online alterna† The author publicly released a working draft of this Article under the
same title in August 2001. This final version adds to the previous draft with
updated statistical data and conclusions.
∗ Associate Professor, University of Ottawa, Faculty of Law. Director of
E-commerce Law, Goodmans LLP. The author would like to thank University
of Ottawa, Faculty of Law students Hafeez Rupani, Anna Russell, Teresa
David, Will Karam and Paul Lewandowski for their research assistance; several reviewers, who for obvious reasons will remain anonymous, for their
comments during the research phase of this study; the staff of the Brooklyn
Journal of International Law and Rene Geist for their editorial assistance;
and Allison Geffen for her continuing love and support. Any errors or omissions remain the sole responsibility of the author. The author can be contacted at mgeist@uottawa.ca.
1. ICANN, Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers Minutes
of
Meeting,
Board
Resolution
99.83,
at
http://www.icann.org/minutes/minutes-26august99.htm (Aug. 26, 1999).
2. ICANN, UNIFORM DOMAIN NAME DISPUTE RESOLUTION POLICY (1999),
at http://www.icann.org/udrp/udrp-policy-24oct99.htm [hereinafter ICANN
POLICY].
3. ICANN reports that as of April 11, 2002, there were 4550 case dispositions involving 7879 domain names. The total number of proceedings
equaled 4936 cases involving 8495 domain names. ICANN, Statistical Summary of Proceedings Under Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy
as of Apr. 11, 2002, at http://www.icann.org/udrp/proceedings-stat.htm (last
visited Apr. 21, 2002).
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tive dispute resolution with supporters suggesting that it can
be used as a model for other e -commerce legal disputes.4
Despite its substantial caseload and some positive reviews,
the UDRP also has its share of critics. There are some who
suggest that the system does not go far enough to protect
trademark holders.5 The South African government, for example, has argued that the policy should better protect country
names and has urged the World Intellectual Property Organization (“WIPO”) to formulate amendments that might be incorporated into a revised version of the UDRP.6 WIPO, in fact,
recently concluded a public consultation on a series of potential
amendments that considered expanding the scope of the UDRP
to explicitly include personal names, geographic designations
and trade names.7

4. For example, Masanobu Katoh, Chairman of the Internet Law & Policy Forum (“ILPF”) and an ICANN board member, remarked at an ILPF conference in September 2000 that:
I have extensive experience with both Japanese and the U.S. court
systems, as well as Alternative Dispute Resolution Proceedings.
Never, and I mean never, have I seen a dispute resolution mechanism work so well. In less than a year, over 1,000 arbitrations have
been initiated under the UDRP.
In more than two thirds of those cases, there already have been a
disposition. These cases have been handled quickly, inexpensively,
and most important of all, fairly. Without question, the UDRP is an
important model for Dispute Resolution in other e-Commerce areas.
INTERNET L AW AND POLICY FORUM , INTERNET LAW AND P OLICY FORUM 2000
ANNUAL CONFERENCE 19 (2000), at http://www.ilpf.org/events/jurisdiction2/conf00d1.pdf.
5. Some critics have bemoaned the absence of a discovery process and the
increasing sophistication of cybersquatters. See Mitchell J. Matorin & M.
Boudett, Domain Name Disputes: Cases Illustrate Limitations of ICANN Policy, 45 BOSTON B.J. 4 (2001). Others have lamented complainants’ inability
to obtain damages. See M.E. Searing, What’s in a Domain Name? A Critical
Analysis of the National and International Impact on Domain Name Cybersquatting, 40 WASHBURN L.J. 110 (2000).
6. See REPUBLIC OF S OUTH AFRICA , S UBMISSION BY REPUBLIC OF S OUTH
AFRICA IN RESPONSE TO WIPO2 RFC-2, available at http://wipo2.wipo.int/
process2/rfc/rfc2-comments/2000/msg00059/wipo2-submission.doc (last visited
Apr. 21, 2002).
7. See WIPO, T HE RECOGNITION OF RIGHTS AND THE USE OF N AMES IN THE
INTERNET DOMAIN N AME S YSTEM (2001), at http://wipo2.wipo.int/process2/rfc/rfc3/pdf/report.pdf.
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Another vocal group of UDRP critics has also emerged, concerned that the system promotes forum shopping and is systemically biased in favor of trademark holders, who are invariably the complainants in domain name disputes.8 These
concerns, which were expressed during the initial drafting of
the UDRP,9 have grown louder as the policy has been put into
practice and data begins to emerge.10
The right of complainants to pick which arbitration provider
handles their dispute has been the target of particularly vociferous criticism.11 Although ICANN initially accredited three
arbitration providers in order to foster a competitive environment, many commentators anticipated that complainants
would engage in forum shopping by rationally selecting arbitration providers who tended to rule in their favor. Those fears
were realized almost immediately. The two ICANN-accredited
8. See M ILTON M UELLER, DIGITAL CONVERGENCE CTR., ROUGH J USTICE : AN
ANALYSIS OF ICANN’S UNIFORM DISPUTE RESOLUTION POLICY (2000), at
http://dcc.syr.edu/roughjustice.htm; Michael Geist, WIPO Wipes Out Domain
Name
Rights,
G LOBETECHNOLOGY. COM
(Aug.
24,
2000),
at
http://www.globetechnology.com/servlet/GAMArticleHTMLTemplate?tf=globe
technology/TGAM/EBusinessFullStory.html&cf=globetechnology/tech-configneutral&slug=TWGEIS&date=20000824.
9. See A. Michael Froomkin, A Commentary on WIPO’s “The Management of Internet Names and Addresses: Intellectual Property Issues,” at
http://personal.law.miami.edu/~amf/commentary.htm (May 19, 1999); A. Michael Froomkin, Comments on ICANN Uniform Dispute Policy, at
http://personal.law.miami.edu/~amf/icann-udp.htm (Oct. 13, 1999).
10. See Marcelo Halpern & Ajay K. Mehrota, Exploring Legal Boundaries
Within Cyberspace: What Law Controls in a Global Marketplace?, 21 U. PA. J.
INT’L ECON . L. 523, 558 (2000) (“[T]he bias toward trademark owners may
have far-reaching and unsettling repercussions.”); A. Michael Froomkin &
David Post, Froomkin and Post Send Letter to ICANN Board,
at
http://www.icannwatch.org/archive/post_froomkin_udrp_letter.htm (Jan. 26,
2000). Froomkin and Post state:
Complainant choice has the useful property of promoting price competition. Unfortunately, economic theory suggests that it also will
tend to promote other types of competition, including competition
among dispute resolution service providers to be perceived as being
most “complainant-friendly” in order to capture all, or a disproportionate share, of the market. We consider this to be a very serious
issue, as even the appearance of partiality would so taint the UDRP
as to call the entire enterprise into question.

Id.
11. See Froomkin & Post, supra note 10.
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providers with the most favorable outcomes for complainants
(WIPO and the National Arbitration Forum (“NAF”)) quickly
captured the lion’s share of the caseload at the expense of
eResolution, the least complainant-friendly of the major
ICANN-accredited providers.12 Furthermore, forum shopping
has continued to increase over time. In February 2001, for example, only three new cases were launched with eResolution,
compared with 268 cases with WIPO and 143 cases with the
NAF.13 Faced with an ever-shrinking caseload, eResolution
shut down its operations in December 2001.14
Although the existence of forum shopping has become common knowledge among those involved with the UDRP, a critical question remains unanswered. While there is clearly an
incentive for arbitration providers to curry favor with potential
complainants in order to attract future cases, how, if at all, do
they do so? The more obvious sources of provider differentiation have only occurred on a fairly small scale. For example,
price competition, one clear method of distinguishing providers,
has thus far been rather limited. Among the three main providers,15 the cost for a single domain, single panelist case starts

12. See M UELLER, supra note 8. Louis Touton, ICANN’s general counsel
has also expressed concern over forum shopping, noting that: “Forum shopping is clearly a problem and if it is occurring it suggests that justice is being
bought and sold.” Oscar S. Cisneros, What to Do with Domain Disputes?,
WIRED NEWS (Nov. 13, 2000), at http://www.wired.com/news/print/
0,1294,39992,00.html.
13. ICANN, List of Proceedings Under Uniform Domain Name Dispute
Resolution Policy, at http://www.icann.org/udrp/proceedings-list.htm (last
visited Apr. 21, 2002).
14. See Steven Bonisteel, Arbitration Firm Quits Domain-Dispute Business, NEWSBYTES
(Dec. 3, 2001), at http://www.newsbytes.com/
news/01/172619.html.
15. The Center for Public Resources (“CPR”) Institute for Dispute Resolution, which received accreditation as an ICANN dispute resolution provider
in May 2000, has thus far been a non-factor in the UDRP. As of February 18,
2002, the provider had only been involved in a total of thirty-one cases. See
CPR Institute for Dispute Resolution, at http://www.cpradr.org (last visited
Apr. 21, 2002). Given the small number, the CPR data is excluded from most
analysis in this Article. A fifth provider, the Asian Domain Name Dispute
Resolution Centre, was approved as an ICANN accredited provider effective
February 28, 2002. It had rendered no decisions as of the date data was collected for this study. Id.
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from a low of $950 (NAF) to a high of $1500 (WIPO).16 When
the legal costs associated with a UDRP action are factored into
the equation, the difference in filing fees is relatively unimportant.
Other differences, such as panelist rosters and language capabilities are even less pronounced. Although initially there
were considerable differences in panelist roster composition,
prior to eResolution ceasing operations, the rosters of the three
providers looked increasingly alike. WIPO’s roster was once
characterized primarily as being comprised of a global group of
trademark attorneys and law professors,17 while the NAF’s roster was described as retired American judges,18 and eResolution’s roster was perceived as international law professors.19
With a growing number of panelists cross-listed with multiple
providers, it is now more difficult to distinguish between provider panelist rosters.20 Moreover, the NAF and eResolution
have increased the international component of their panelist
rosters, narrowing the gap with WIPO and improving their
ability to address cases in foreign languages and with non-U.S.
parties.
Marketing techniques clearly illustrate one area of differentiation between providers, with the NAF adopting a far more
aggressive approach than the other providers in the marketing
of its services. Unlike both WIPO and eResolution, the NAF
regularly distributed press releases heralding recent decisions.
The releases took on a distinctly pro-complainant tone in the
16. Three-member panel, single domain cases are even closer in cost. Fees
start at a low of $2500 with the NAF and increase to a high of $3000 with
WIPO.
See WIPO, Schedule of Fees Under the ICANN Policy, at
http://arbiter.wipo.int/domains/fees/index.html (last visited Apr. 20, 2002);
National Arbitration Forum, Code of Procedure, Appendix C: Fee Schedule, at
http://www.arb-forum.com/arbitration/NAF/Code_linked/apdx_c.htm
(last
visited Apr. 20, 2002); E RESOLUTION , E RESOLUTION S UPPLEMENTAL R ULES ¶19
(1999), available at http://www.eresolution.com/services/dnd/p_r/supprules.
htm [hereinafter E RESOLUTION RULES].
17. See Stacey H. King, The “Law That It Deems Applicable”: ICANN,
Dispute Resolution, and the Problem of Cybersquatting, 22 HASTINGS COMM. &
ENT. L.J. 453, 477 (2000).
18. See Tamara Loomis, Domain Name Disputes Get Swift Resolution
Under UDRP, 224 N.Y. L.J. 5 (2000).
19. See King, supra note 17, at 479.
20. For a complete list of cross-listed panelists as of July 31, 2001, see
Annex A.
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months prior to the August 2001 public release of a draft of this
study.21 The author, who is on the NAF’s media distribution
list, received eleven press releases from May through August
2001, ten of which promoted a complainant win. Featuring
headlines such as Arbitrator Delivers Internet Order for
Fingerhut22 and May the Registrant of magiceightball.com Keep
the Domain . . . Not Likely,23 the releases do little to engender
confidence in the neutrality of the NAF.24
The providers’ supplemental rules also provide a point of difference. For example, each provider takes a slightly different
approach to respondents’ response rights. WIPO does not provide any supplemental rules on responses. It relies instead on
the ICANN Rules for Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (“ICANN Rules”), which outline that responses must
be filed within twenty days25 and that extensions may be
granted either in exceptional cases or if the par ties mutually
agree to an extension.26 eResolution similarly relied on the
ICANN Rules for respondent submissions, but included an ad21. The release of a working draft of this study generated considerable
interest among those involved in the ICANN UDRP process as well as with
the media. See Julia Angwin, Are Domian Panels the Hanging Judges of
Cyberspace Court?, W ALL S T. J., Aug. 20, 2001, at B1; Steven Bonisteel, Law
Expert Charges Bias in Domain-Dispute Arbitrations, NEWSBYTES, Aug. 20,
2001, 2001 WL 23417533; Patrick Brethour, Web Arbitration Biased: Study,
GLOBE AND M AIL, Aug. 20, 2001, at B4; Domain Disputes Don’t Get Fair Hearing Says Study, DOW JONES REUTERS BUS ., Aug. 21, 2001, 2001 WL 17928390;
Gwendolyn Mariano, Web Address Disputes Deemed Unfair, CNET NEWS. COM
(Dec. 4, 2001), at http://news.com.com/2100-1023-276607.html?legacy=cnet;
Joe Salkowski, Big Guys Usually Win Best Addresses, C HI . TRIB., Dec. 3,
2001, at 5.
22. Press Release, National Arbitration Forum, Arbitrator Delivers Internet Order for Fingerhut (May 4, 2001) (on file with Journal).
23. Press Release, National Arbitration Forum, May the Registrant of
magiceightball.com Keep the Domain . . . Not Likely (Aug. 10, 2001) (on file
with Journal).
24. See Press Release, National Arbitration Forum, Kevin Spacey Prevails
Against Usual Suspect in Domain Name Case (May 11, 2001) (on file with
Journal); Press Release, National Arbitration Forum, Holder of Beatles Domain Names Must “Get Back” (June 8, 2001) (on file with Journal); Press
Release, National Arbitration Forum, Skateboard Magazine Thrashes Spanish Double (June 21, 2001) (on file with Journal).
25. ICANN, RULES FOR UNIFORM DOMAIN NAME DISPUTE RESOLUTION
POLICY § 5(a) (1999), available at http://www.icann.org/udrp/udrp-rules24oct99.htm [hereinafter ICANN RULES].
26. Id. § 5(d).
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ditional provision that granted a respondent five calendar days
to correct any deficiencies in its submission once so notified by
the provider.27 The NAF, meanwhile, contains the most detailed and onerous requirements for an extension. Restrictions
Dispute Resolution for Domain Names (“RDRP”) Supplemental
Rules (“NAF Supplemental Rules”) paragraph 6(a) states that:
Paragraph 5(d) of the Rules provides that the Respondent
may request additional time to submit a Response, or may be
given additional time if the parties stipulate to an extension
and the Forum approves. Any request by the Respondent for
an extension or any joint request by the parties for an extension shall:
(i) be submitted after the parties have first conferred with
each other to see if they could reach an agreement concerning
the requested extension;
(ii) be submitted in writing to the Forum and the parties
within the time for the Response to be submitted;
(iii) state the exceptional circumstances warranting the request for an extension;
(iv) state the length of the extension being requested (no
more than twenty (20) additional days); and
(v) be accompanied by an extension fee of $100. 28

The NAF Supplemental Rules, which were added in May
2000, clearly place an additional burden on a respondent seeking an extension and has been characterized by some comme ntators as “worrisome” and “extremely biased.”29 At a minimum,
the NAF Supplemental Rules distinguish the NAF from its
competitors.
Since most of the differentiating factors are somewhat benign, the most prominent difference between providers remains
case outcome. Simply put, complainants win more frequently
with WIPO and the NAF than with eResolution. The author
conducted a statistical analysis of all ICANN UDRP decisions
through February 18, 2002, the results of which are discussed

27. E RESOLUTION RULES ¶ (7)(c)(ii)(2).
28. NATIONAL A RBITRATION FORUM , RESTRICTIONS DISPUTE RESOLUTION FOR
DOMAIN N AMES (“RDRP”) S UPPLEMENTAL R ULES § 6(a) (2002), available at
http://www.arbforum.com/domains/RDRP/RDRP_supp_Rules.rtf (last visited
Apr. 20, 2002) [hereinafter NAF RULES].
29. King, supra note 17, at 498.
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throughout the Article.30 The statistical data, which has remained consistent since the introduction of the UDRP, shows
that complainants win 80.6% of the time with WIPO, 83.3% of
the time with the NAF, but only 61.1% of the time with eResolution.31 Since outcome is what matters most to complainants,
they have rewarded WIPO and the NAF with an overwhelming
share of the UDRP caseload. Despite the highest fees, neutral
rules and low-key marketing, WIPO commands 59.2% of the
UDRP caseload, compared with 34.5% for the NAF and a paltry
5.6% for eResolution.32
With the statistical evidence leaving little doubt that forum
shopping is part of the UDRP, this study takes the next step by
determining whether bias may exist within the system and, if
so, how it manifests itself. With differences such as fees, marketing and supplemental rules between providers transparent
to all, the starting point for a deeper analysis into case outcomes must be to focus on aspects of the UDRP that are not
transparent. The primary focus of this Article is therefore on
panelist allocation.
Although the ICANN Rules and provider supplemental rules
indicate how panelists are selected,33 little is known about how
providers determine precisely which panelists serve on what
cases. Panelist allocation has become particularly important as
the providers’ panelist rosters have converged. As noted above,
each provider’s roster now features an impressive contingent of
international panelists capable of addressing disputes between
litigants in different languages and legal systems. Moreover, a
growing number of panelists are cross-listed — that is, they are
featured on the roster of more than one provider.34 The multi30. All UDRP statistical data has been compiled by the author and reflects all decisions released as of February 18, 2002. As discussed above, the
author released an earlier version of this study in August 2001 that covered
all decisions as of July 7, 2001. Unless otherwise noted, this Article cites to
the more updated data.
See Michael Geist, UDRPinfo.com, at
http://www.udrpinfo.com/bjil (last modified Mar. 2002) [hereinafter GeistDatabase].
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. See ICANN RULES § 6(b)-(e).
34. As of July 31, 2001, sixty-three panelists were listed on the roster of at
least two providers. See infra Annex A for a complete list of cross-listed panelists.
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provider phenomenon was particularly common with WIPO
and eResolution, where despite markedly different case outcomes, twenty-eight of the panelists were featured on both rosters as of August 2001.35
The existence of multi-provider panelists complicates the
bias question considerably. If each of the providers’ panel rosters were distinctly different, differences in case outcomes
could be attributed to the varying comp osition of provider panels. In such a scenario, one might expect differences in case
outcomes since providers could staff their panelist rosters with
the panelists most likely to deliver the d esired outcomes. Since
many of the same panelists decide cases for multiple providers,
however, it seems unlikely that the composition of a provider’s
panelist roster alone would explain differences in case outcomes. Accordingly, if many of the same panelists are deciding
cases for multiple providers, how is it that complainants win
over 80% of the time with WIPO and NAF, and only 61% of the
time with eResolution?
Following a review of over 4000 cases, the answer becomes
clear. The critical issue does not rest with the roster of panelists per se, but rather with how the roster is deployed. Anal ysis of all UDRP cases decided as of February 18, 2002 reveals
several striking trends that provide new insight into how the
UDRP decision-making process functions in practice. The
study finds that influence over panel composition is likely the
most important controlling factor in determining case outcomes.36 The data shows that when providers control who decides a case, which they do for all single panel cases, complai nants win just over 83% of the time.37 When provider influence
over panelists diminishes — which occurs in three-member
panel cases, as in these cases both the complainant and respondent choose one of the panelists as well as exercise some
influence over the choice of the third member of the panel —
35. Geist-Database, supra note 30.
36. This should not be taken to suggest that the merits of the case are
unimportant. The strength of the bad faith claim and complainant rights in
the domain are, of course, crucial. The data suggests, however, that panelist
allocation is a significant determinant of case outcome, particularly for those
cases that are not clear-cut cases of cybersquatting or do not fall squarely
within a strict interpretation of the UDRP.
37. Geist-Database, supra note 30.
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the complainant winning percentage drops to 60%.38 Moreover,
this differential remains consistent when examining both uncontested cases, frequently referred to as defaults, as well as
contested cases.39
In addition to the dramatic difference in outcome between
single and three-member panels, the study finds that case allocation appears to be heavily biased toward ensuring that a majority of cases are steered toward complainant-friendly panelists.
Most troubling is data which suggests that, despite
claims of impartial random case allocation as well as a large
roster of 135 panelists,40 the majority of the NAF single panel
cases are actually assigned to little more than a handful of
panelists.41 As of February 18, 2002, an astonishing 56% of all
NAF single panel cases — 778 of 1379 — were decided by only
six people.42 The complainant winning percentage in those
cases was an astounding 95%.43 Although default cases constitute a portion of those cases, the skewed caseload is unique to
the NAF with neither WIPO nor eResolution presenting a similar caseload imbalance.44
The NAF is not alone on the issue of caseload allocation bias,
as WIPO’s track record also raises concerns. A review of all
WIPO panelists who have decided five or more single panel
cases (and thus have a track record) finds that there are 121
such panelists, all of whom have a complainant win percentage
that is higher than at least two respondent-friendly WIPO panelists who have never been selected for sole panelist duty.45 In
fact, all of the 121 panelists have a complainant winning percentage of 50% or better.46
38. Id.
39 Id.
40. E-mail from Timothy Cole, Assistant Director of Arbitration, National
Arbitration Forum, to Michael Geist, Associate Professor of Law, University
of Ottawa, Faculty of Law (July 19, 2001, 08:29:51 EST) (on file with Journal)
[hereinafter Cole E-mail].
41. Geist-Database, supra note 30.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. The six busiest WIPO panelists constitute 17.1% of that provider’s
single panel caseload; the six busiest eResolution panelists constitute 20.5%
of that provider’s single panel caseload. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
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Following a brief historical review of the development of the
UDRP and an introduction to its rules in Part II of this Article,
Part III examines these numbers in greater detail. The Article
concludes in Part IV with recommendations for changes to the
UDRP designed to instill greater fairness and confidence in the
process.
II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE UDRP
The Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (“IANA”), headed
by the late Jon Postel, initially managed the Domain Name
System (“DNS”).47 Growing demand from businesses and ind ividuals, however, together with the increasing administrative
burden of maintaining the system resulted in changes to the
system in 1992.48 That year, the United States government
granted Network Solutions, Inc. (“NSI”) the exclusive right to
register three generic top-level domain names (“TLDs”) —
“.com,” “.net” and “.org.”49 As part of the registration right,
which was initially scheduled to last five years, NSI was
charged with managerial responsibility for the maintenance of
the DNS.50
With the first agreement set to expire in 1997, the U.S. Department of Commerce (“DOC”) granted NSI a two-year extension.51 In return, NSI agreed to create a Shared Registry System that would allow competing companies to register “.com,”
“.org” and “.net” domains.52 Moreover, once a competitive registrar system was established, NSI agreed to apply for accreditation through the same process as other registrars, thereby

47. See King, supra note 17, at 459-60.
48. See id. at 460.
49. See id.
50. See Kevin Eng, Breaking Through the Looking Glass: An Analysis of
Trademark Rights in Domain Names Across Top Level Domains, 6 B.U. J.
S CI . & TECH. L. 7 (2000).
51. See Courtney Macavinta, Deal Extends NSI Domain Control, CNET
NEWS.COM (Oct. 6, 1998), at http://news.com.com/2100-1023-216367.html;
Network Solutions, Inc., US Government Extends Network Solutions Cooperative Agreement Through September 2000, at http://corporate.verisign.com/
news/1998/pr_19981006.html (last visited Apr. 20, 2002).
52. See Luke A. Walker, ICANN’s Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy, 15 BERKELEY TECH . L.J. 289, 293-94 (2000).
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relinquishing its competitive advantage over the domain name
registry market.53
NSI did not have a formal dispute resolution mechanism to
address domain name disputes when it took over the registry
responsibilities from IANA.54 As disputes began to mount, NSI
recognized the need for a dispute resolution policy.55 Early efforts, however, became a source of frustration for trademark
owners and domain name registrants alike since the dispute
policies focused primarily on protecting NSI from liability.56
Prior to 1995, NSI maintained that domain name registrants
bore the responsibility for ensuring that their domain name did
not infringe upon any trademark rights, but did not otherwise
provide a formal dispute resolution policy.57 NSI released its
first formal domain name dispute policy in July 1995.58 It allowed trademark owners to challenge the registration of a domain name by presenting NSI with evidence that the domain
name infringed upon their trademark rights.59 The policy required the trademark holder to present evidence that their
trademark was identical to the registered domain name.60 The
domain name registrant could successfully defend their right to
the domain by presenting a valid trademark of its own.61 If the
trademark holder was unable to produce evidence of a registered trademark, NSI would allow the domain name registrant
to retain the domain for ninety days as part of a transition
process.62 If the domain name registrant refused to accept an
alternative domain, NSI would place the domain “on hold” so
that neither party could use it.63

53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

Id. at 294.
Id. at 295.
See Eng, supra note 50, at 8.
Id. at 8-9.
See Walker, supra note 52, at 295.
See NETWORK S OLUTIONS , INC., DOMAIN DISPUTE RESOLUTION POLICY
S TATEMENT (July 1995).
59. See id.
60. See id.
61. See id.
62. See id.
63. See id.
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NSI issued its first amendment to the policy in November
1995. 64 The revised policy addressed situations where the domain name registration pre-dated the issuance of a trademark.65 In those situations, the domain name registrant was
entitled to keep the domain, provided that it agreed to post a
bond to indemnify NSI from any liability.66
NSI revised its dispute resolution policy yet again in Se ptember 1996.67 The new policy required trademark owners to
notify domain name registrants of their legal claim before
commencing a dispute resolution action.68 Moreover, the policy
established limitations on the domain name registrants’ defense of a competing trademark by requiring that the trademark be issued prior to the commencement of the dispute resolution action.69 This latter change was needed after domain
name registrants began obtaining quick trademark registrations from Tunisia.70
NSI revised its dispute resolution policy for the final time in
February 1998.71 That revision allowed trademark owners to
immediately place domain names “on hold” pending the resolution of the dispute.72 The domain name registrant, if challenged, could prevent the domain name from being placed on
hold by submitting evidence which established that the domain
name was registered before the complainant’s trademark or the
domain name holder owned a competing trademark in the domain name.73
Predictably, neither domain name registrants nor trademark
holders were satisfied with the NSI policies. Domain name
registrants argued that the policy was too broad, placing them
64. See NETWORK S OLUTIONS , INC., DOMAIN DISPUTE RESOLUTION POLICY
S TATEMENT (Nov. 1995).
65. See id.
66. See id.
67. See NETWORK S OLUTIONS , INC., DOMAIN DISPUTE RESOLUTION POLICY
S TATEMENT (1996).
68. See id.
69. See id.
70. See G. Peter Albert, Eminent Domain Names: The Struggle to Gain
Control of the Internet Domain Name System, 16 J. M ARSHALL J. COMPUTER &
INFO. L. 781, 790 (1998).
71. See NETWORK S OLUTIONS , INC., DOMAIN DISPUTE RESOLUTION POLICY
S TATEMENT (1998).
72. Walker, supra note 52, at 295.
73. Id.
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at a disadvantage because trademark owners could invoke the
dispute resolution policy and place a domain name on hold,
even if the domain name registration was for products or services bearing no similarity to the trad emark use.74 Trademark
owners, meanwhile, found the policy lacking because it could
only be invoked where a domain name was identical to a registered trademark and because placing the domain on hold was
not an effective remedy where a domain name transfer was
desired.75
As the number of domain name lawsuits mushroomed and
concerns over the stability of the DNS increased, the National
Telecommunications and Information Administration (“NTIA”),
an agency of the DOC, issued a draft discussion paper in Fe bruary 1998, titled Improvement of Technical Management of
Internet Names and Addresses (“Green Paper”).76 The Green
Paper’s stated goals were privatization and international participation in the DNS as well as increased competition in registry services.77 Following the Green Paper consultation, the
NTIA published a final report, the Management of Internet
Names and Addresses (“White Paper”) in June 1998.78 A key
concern expressed during the Green Paper public consultations
was the fear that the U.S. would seek to impose U.S. trademark law on the Internet for the resolution of domain name
disputes.79
In an attempt to alleviate this concern, the White Paper
committed to a WIPO-led international process to develop recommendations for a uniform approach to resolving trademark
and domain name disputes.80 A balanced process that included
both trademark holders and members of the Internet community was envisioned. The White Paper was also careful to establish limitations on the new dispute resolution mechanism by
specifying that it was only to address cybersquatting and/or
74. Id. at 296.
75. Id.
76. Improvement of Technical Management of Internet Names and Addresses, 63 Fed. Reg. 8826 (Feb. 20, 1998) (to be codified at 15 C.F.R. ch. 23).
77. Id. at 8826.
78. Management of Internet Names and Addresses, 63 Fed. Reg. 31,741
(June 10, 1998).
79. See id. at 31,746-47.
80. See id. at 31,747.
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cyberpiracy disputes.81 Other domain name disputes, such as
competing trademark interests, were left to be settled by the
courts.82
Pursuant to the White Paper recommendation, the U.S. government approved the creation of ICANN, granting the new
non-profit corporation the responsibility for centralizing the
management of the DNS.83 Meanwhile, in consultation with
WIPO, the beginning of a new dispute resolution policy began
to emerge. WIPO published its first Request for Comments
(“RFC-1”) in July 1998,84 followed soon after by two further Requests (“RFC-2”85 and “RFC-3”86) calling for public consultation. Public comments raised numerous criticisms, including:
(1) the perception that the proposed policy was unfairly biased
in favor of trademark holders; (2) the policy’s broad scope; (3)
the mandatory nature of the dispute resolution proceedings; (4)
the policy’s impact on freedom of expression; (5) the expense of
the process; (6) the impact of the proceedings on subsequent
litigation; (7) choice of law issues; (8) treatment of famous
marks; (9) procedural concerns; and (10) the possibility that
future technological change might render the proposed policy
obsolete.87 WIPO released its final report, The Management of
Internet Names and Addresses: Intellectual Property Issues
(“Final Report”) in April 1999, addressing some, though not all,
of the concerns.88
Using the WIPO Final Report and the White Paper as its
guide, ICANN moved quickly to draft a policy to address cyber81. See id.
82. See id.
83. See id. at 31,749.
84. WIPO, WIPO RFC-1: Request for Comments on Terms of Reference,
Procedures and Timetable for the WIPO Internet Domain Name Process, at
http://wipo2.wipo.int/process1/rfc/1/index.html (last visited Apr. 20, 2002).
85. WIPO, WIPO RFC-2: Request for Comments on Issues Addressed in the
Second
WIPO
Internet
Domain
Name
Process,
at
http://wipo2.wipo.int/process1/rfc/2/index.htm (last visited Apr. 20, 2002).
86. WIPO, Interim Report of the WIPO Internet Domain Name Process, at
http://wipo2.wipo.int/process1/rfc/3/index.htm (last visited Apr. 20, 2002).
87. See WIPO, First WIPO Process-Request for Comments, at
http://wipo2.wipo.int/process1/rfc/index.html (last visited Apr. 20, 2002).
88. See WIPO, THE M ANAGEMENT OF INTERNET NAMES AND ADDRESSES:
INTELLECTUAL P ROPERTY ISSUES (1999), available at http://wipo2.wipo.int/
process1/report/doc/report.doc. For a summary of the recommendations found
in the Final Report, see King, supra note 17, at 464-67.
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squatting and related issues.89 Only months after the completion of the WIPO consultation, the ICANN board of directors
approved the UDRP and its accompanying rules on October 24,
1999. 90 The UDRP differs from the NSI dispute resolution policy in three material respects: (1) trademark owners are no
longer able to place a hold on domain names during the dispute-resolution process; (2) trademark owners can only invoke
a UDRP proceeding if the domain name was registered and is
being used in bad faith; and (3) the administrative dispute
resolution proceeding is mandatory for all domain name registrants.91
Registrants are required to submit to a mandatory administrative proceeding conducted by a dispute resolution service
provider, approved by ICANN, where a complainant asserts
that:
(1) the domain name is identical or confusingly similar to a
trademark or service mark in which the complainant has
rights;
(2) the registrant has no rights or legitimate interests in respect to the domain name; and
(3) the domain name has been registered and is being used in
bad faith.92
To succeed, the complainant must prove that all three elements
are present.93 The policy also provides some guidance as to
what constitutes evidence of bad faith registration and use of a
domain name.94 They include:
(1) circumstances indicating that the registrant has acquired
the domain name primarily for the purpose of selling, renting
or otherwise transferring it to the complainant who is the
owner of the trademark or service mark, or to a competitor of
the complainant, for valuable consideration in excess of “out-ofpocket” costs directly related to the domain name;95
89. See King, supra note 17, at 468.
90. See ICANN, Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers
Minutes
of
Meeting,
Board
Resolution
99.81,
at
http://www.icann.org/minutes/minutes-26aug99.htm (Aug. 26, 1999).
91. See Walker, supra note 52, at 299-300.
92. See ICANN POLICY § 4(a)(i)-(iii).
93. Id.
94. See id. § 4(b).
95. Id. § (i).
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(2) the registrant has registered the domain name in order to
prevent the owner of the trademark or service mark from reflecting the mark in a corresponding domain name, provided
that a pattern of such conduct is evidenced;96
(3) the domain name has been registered primarily for the
purpose of disrupting the business of a competitor;97 or
(4) the domain name has been registered primarily for commercial gain through creating a likelihood of confusion.98
A respondent can demonstrate rights or a legitimate interest
in a domain name by presenting evidence that:
(1) before any notice to the respondent of the dispute, the respondent used or prepared to use, the domain name or a name
corresponding to the domain name in connection with a bona
fide offering of goods or services;
(2) the respondent has been commonly known by the domain
name, even if no trademark or service mark rights have been
acquired; and
(3) legitimate non-commercial or fair use of the domain
name, without intent to divert consumers or tarnish the
trademark or service mark for commercial gain, is being
made.99
A proceeding commences when the complainant submits a
complaint to an ICANN approved dispute resolution service
provider of its choosing. The complainant must specify
whether the dispute is to be decided by a single-member or
three-member panel.100 The fee for a single-member panel is
paid entirely by the complainant.101 In the event that a threemember panel is requested, the complainant must submit
names and contacts of three candidates from a roster of any
ICANN-approved provider to serve as one of the panelists.102
Following a compliance review, the provider forwards the complaint to the respondent.103 The respondent must submit a response to the provider within twenty days of commencement of
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.

Id. § 4(b)(ii).
Id. § 4(b)(iii).
ICANN POLICY § 4(b)(iv).
Id. § 4(c)(i)-(iii).
See ICANN RULES § 3(b)(iv).
Id. § 6(b).
Id. § 4(b)(iv).
Id. § 4(a).
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the proceeding.104 If no response is submitted, the panel decides the case based solely upon the evidence furnished by the
complainant.105
Even if the complainant has requested a single-member
panel, the respondent has the right to have the dispute decided
by a three-member panel instead.106 If either the complainant
or respondent requests a three-member panel, the respondent
must provide the names and contact details of three candidates
to serve as one of the panelists, which can also be drawn from
any ICANN-approved provider’s roster.107 Where the complainant has elected to have the dispute decided by a singlemember panel and the respondent requests a three-member
panel, the respondent is required to pay one -half of the applicable fee for a three-member panel.108
If the complainant requests a single-member panel and the
respondent does not object, the provider alone assigns a single
panelist from its roster to the case.109 If a three-member panel
is selected, one panelist each is selected from the list of candidates provided by both the complainant and the respondent.110
The third panelist is appointed by the provider from a list of
five candidates submitted by the provider to the parties, the
selection from among the five being “made in a manner that
reasonably balances the preferences of both Parties.”111 The
typical approach is to allow each party to strike out up to two
names from the list of five.112 ICANN policy provides that panelists should be “impartial and independent” and must disclose
any circumstances that may give rise to justifiable doubt as to
the panelist’s impartiality or independence.113 Parties must be
treated with equality by the panel, with each party accorded a
fair opportunity to present its case.114

104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.

Id. § 5(a).
Id. § 5(e).
See ICANN RULES § 5(b)(iv).
Id. § 5(b)(v).
Id. § 5(c).
Id. § 6(b).
Id. § 6(e).
Id.
Cole E-mail, supra note 40.
See ICANN RULES § 7.
Id. § 10(b).
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III. THE STUDY
A. Methodology and Basic Findings
The study was initially designed to analyze all UDRP decisions through early July 2001, though it was updated prior to
publication to include all UDRP decisions as of February 18,
2002. It commenced in early May 2001 with a case-by-case review of each decision. Each case was reviewed for contested
domain name, proceeding number, panelist, arbitration provider, commencement date, panel type (single or three-member
panel) and outcome. Since the current search functionality
supported by ICANN and the arbitration providers is limited to
identifying particular cases, the data was culled directly from
the cases the mselves, which are posted on each provider’s website.115 In the update to the study, the author re-examined all
cases to verify the accuracy of the initial data, collected information related to contested and uncontested cases, as well as
added all new decisions since July 2001.
The data was initially entered into a Microsoft Excel spreadsheet, grouped by panelist and later transferred onto a webbased database. Data analysis was conducted on a range of
issues including overall provider and panelist outcome s, single
versus three-member panel outcomes, panelist caseload, multiprovider panelist outcomes and data on panelists serving only
on three-member panels.
Basic information on the initial round of collected data included:
• Four thousand three hundred and thirty-two cases were
examined, of which 2565 were WIPO cases, 1493 were NAF
cases, 244 were eResolution cases and thirty-one were CPR
cases.116

115. See WIPO, at http://arbiter.wipo.int/domains/cases/index.html (last
visited
Apr.
20,
2002);
National
Arbitration
Forum,
at
http://www.arbforum.com/domains/decisions.asp (last visited Apr. 20, 2002);
eResolution, at http://www.eresolution.ca/services/dnd/decisions.htm (last
visited Apr. 20, 2002).
116. Michael Geist, Microsoft Excel Spreadsheet (2001) (unpublished research data, on file with Journal) [hereinafter Geist-Spreadsheet].
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• Three thousand eight hundred and eighty-one (89.6%) of
the cases were single panel cases; 417 (9.6%) featured threemember panels.117
• Thirty-one panelists participated exclusively in threemember panels. These panelists were involved in ninety-eight
cases.118
B. Key Findings
1. The Dramatic Effect of Three-Member Panels
Although little attention was accorded to the possible differences between single and three-member panels during the public discussion of the UDRP, by far the most important finding of
this study is the dramatic difference in case outcomes in single
versus three-member panel cases. Single panel cases constitute just over 90% of the total UDRP caseload, while threemember panels comprise the remaining 10%, with 417 such
cases decided as of February 18, 2002. 119 Across all providers,
complainants win 83% of the time where only a single panelist
determines the outcome, compared with 58% when a threemember panel is responsible for the decision.120
Three-member panel complainant win percentages remain
roughly consistent across all providers. The NAF has the lar gest differential (37.4%) between single and three-member panels; complainants win 86% of the time in single-member panel
cases but only 48.6% of the time in three-member panel
cases.121 The WIPO differential is somewhat smaller at 20.8%
(complainant single-member panel win percentage of 82.9%;
three-member panel win percentage of 62.1%), while eResolution, unsurprisingly, has the smallest differential of 11.8%
(complainant single-member panel win percentage of 61.8%;
three-member panel win percentage of 50%).122
One might expect that the difference between a single and
three-member panel is attributable to substantively stronger
respondent cases in three-member panel cases. That theory
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.

Id.
Id.
Geist-Database, supra note 30.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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would posit that respondents are willing to incur the additional
expense involved in a three-member panel in order to protect
their domain name when they have a particularly strong argument. Moreover, unlike single-member panel cases, where
respondents sometimes fail to submit a response and thus further decrease their chances of retaining their domain name,
one might expect that three-member panel cases would rarely
involve a non-response or “default.”123
The data conclusively finds otherwise, however. Contrary to
expectations, complainants actually request three-member
panels more frequently than do respondents. Although the
data is somewhat incomplete since some decisions do not disclose which party requested the three-member panel, the author was able to ascertain this information for 238 of the 292
three-member panel cases as of July 7, 2001.124 In that sample,
complainants requested the three-member panel 62% of the
time (148 of 238 cases).125
Furthermore, three-member panel cases actually do include
a significant number of defaults. Of the 417 three-member
panel cases as of February 18, 2002, the respondent failed to
provide a response 24.5% of the time (102 of 417).126 Complainants won all but one of those cases.127 In fact, when default cases are excluded from the three-member panel case outcomes, complainants win only 46% of the time.128
Interestingly, differences between single and three-member
panels remain very consistent for both contested and uncontested cases. When the sample size is limited solely to contested (non-default) cases, complainants win 68% of the time
(1109 of 1639) in single panel cases, but only 46% of the time
123. In fact, the NAF Supplemental Rules explicitly encourage avoiding
three-member panel default cases by providing complainants with the option
of switching to a single panelist where the respondent fails to submit a response. The NAF provides the complainant with a refund of the difference in
panel cost. See NAF RULES § 9(c).
124. Geist-Spreadsheet, supra note 116. Data was obtained from the cases
where available. Where unavailable, panelists were asked directly if they
could recall which party requested the three-member panel. The author
thanks the many panelists who responded to the request.
125. Id.
126. Geist-Database, supra note 30.
127. Id.
128. Id.
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(forty-five of 314) in three-member panel cases, a 22% differential that compares quite favorably to the 25% differential when
all cases are considered.129 In fact, the differential between
providers remains the same as well with complainants winning
70% and 69% of the time in single-member panel cases with
WIPO (636 of 914) and NAF (400 of 579) respectively, but only
50% of the time with eResolution (sixty-five of 131).130 The
three-member panel outcomes by provider show complainants
winning 48% of contested cases with WIPO (ninety-eight of
203), 42% with NAF (thirty-nine of ninety-three), and 47% with
eResolution (seven of fifteen).131
This data points to two conclusions. First, the inclusion of
uncontested cases is largely immaterial in determining provider differences in complainant win percentages (19 to 22%
difference between WIPO/NAF and eResolution when all cases
are included; 19 to 20% difference between WIPO/NAF and
eResolution for non-default cases only). Second, the inclusion
of defaults does not affect the difference in complainant win
percentage when comparing single and three-member panels
(23% difference for all cases; 22% difference for non-default
cases).
This data begs several questions. First, if strength of respondent case and uncontested cases are not the reason behind
the single versus three-member panel outcome differential,
why the dramatic difference? Second, what motivates complainants to select the three-member panel option, when the
data suggests that single-member panels rule overwhelmingly
in their favor?
A partial answer to both questions may well be the number
of inconsistent, wrongly decided and poorly reasoned UDRP
decisions. While every adjudicative system will have its share
of bad decisions, the UDRP has come under heavy criticism for
inconsistent decisions,132 decisions lacking virtually any rea129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Compare, e.g., Guerlain S.A. v. HI Investments, WIPO Arbitration and
Mediation Center, Case No. D2000-0494 (2000) (Glas, Arb.), available at
http://www.arbiter.wipo.int/domains/decisions/html/2000/d2000-0494.html
(dispute over the buyguerlain.com domain), with Sporoptic Pouilloux S.A. v.
William H. Wilson, WIPO Arbitration and Mediation Center, Case No.
D2000-0265
(2000),
(Introvigne,
Arb.),
available
at
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soning133 and decisions that have clearly misinterpreted the
UDRP.134 Inconsistent and poorly reasoned decisions dimi nish
both respondent and complainant confidence in the system.
Respondents are concerned by the over 80% complainant success rate and may see the entire system as unfair. Complai nants, while unque stionably pleased with an over 80% likelihood
of winning, may still be unhappy, particularly if they have a
strong case since they may fear that the single panelist assigned to their case may be the one that misinterprets the policy. The UDRP is therefore perceived by some complainants to
be a gamble with very good odds. While that may be fine for
some complainants, for those with cases that they believe are
unquestionably instances of bad faith cybersquatting, it may be
a gamble they are unwilling to take. Both respondents and
complainants therefore turn to the three-member panel as a
method of hedging against bias and bad decisions.
At least three factors contribute to the greater confidence in
the three-member panel. First, this panel configuration eliminates the possibility that a single panelist may simply misinterpret the UDRP and render the wrong decision. Second, the
three-member panel forces panelists to more carefully consider
their decisions by justifying it before their counterparts on the
panel. For example, at least one well-known panelist, who has
participated in several three-member panel cases, advised the
http://www.arbiter.wipo.int/domains/decisions/html/2000/d2000-0265.html.
Although WIPO panelists decided both cases with similar facts, the outcomes
were markedly different as buyguerlain.com was transferred to the complainant, while the registrant retained the rights to buyvuarnetsunglasses.com.
133. See, e.g., Rockport Boat Line, Ltd. v. Gananoque Boat Line, Ltd., National Arbitration Forum, Forum File No. FA0004000094653 (2000) (Karem,
Arb.), available at http://www.arbforum.com/domains/decisions/94653.htm
(dispute over the rockportboatline.com domain). Rockport brought the action
against Gananoque Boat Line, the domain name registrant and its competitor across the river. In a peculiar decision, not only did the panelist rule in
favor of the registrant and refuse to transfer the domain, but did so without
providing much analytical reasoning. See id.
134. See, e.g., Reg Vardy Plc v. David Wilkinson, WIPO Arbitration and
Mediation Center, Case No. D2001-0593 (2001) (Thorne, Arb.), available at
http://www.arbiter.wipo.int/domains/decisions/html/2001/d2001-0593.html
(dispute over the reg-vardy.com domain). The WIPO panelist openly admitted
that the case did not meet with the requirements needed for transfer, yet
proceeded to transfer to the domain notwithstanding that admission. See id.
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author that he successfully persuaded his fellow panelists to
change their votes on more than one occasion.
Third, and most importantly, the three-member panel completely alters the panelist selection process. In a singlemember panel case, the arbitration provider is exclusively responsible for allocating the case to a panelist.135 Conversely, in
a three-member panel case, the arbitration provider wields
comparatively little influence over the selection process. Both
the complainant and respondent are typically allowed to select
one of the three panel members by submitting a list of three or
five acceptable candidates from which the provider will select
one.136 The provider selects the third member of the panel, but
only after it has provided both the complainant and respondent
with the opportunity to indicate which panelist it prefers.137
Furthermore, the roster of available panelists changes dramatically in a three-member panel. Unlike a single-member
panel case, in which the provider selects a single panelist from
amongst its roster, the complainant and respondent are under
no such limitation in a three-member panel case. In those
cases, the ICANN Rules allow parties to nominate any panelist
from any ICANN-accredited provider’s roster.138 This rule
more than doubles the number of available panelists and ensures that both parties can seek out panelists they view as favorable to their case without regard to the provider.
Although the benefit of broadening the panelist field was apparent to many, the importance of removing much of the provider’s responsibility for case allocation was less apparent since
all providers maintain that case allocation occurs on a random
basis. If that were the case, panelist selection would not be a
matter for concern. A close examination of the data suggests,
however, that single panelist selection may be anything but
random.
2. Suggestions of Bias Within UDRP Caseload Allocation
As noted above, the UDRP Rules refer only briefly to the issue of single-member panel selection. Article 6(b) specifies that
135.
136.
137.
138.

See ICANN RULES § 6(b).
Id. § 6(e).
Id.
Id. § 6(d).
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providers shall select a panelist from their roster with the cost
to be paid entirely by the complainant.139 The providers’ supplemental rules similarly include scant information on the issue, with most focused on the three-member panel selection
process.140 Neither WIPO nor the NAF provide any additional
rules on single panelist selections. Alone among the three major providers, the eResolution Supplemental Rules provide that
“[w]hen appointing a Panelist, the Clerk’s office shall take into
account the Panelist’s nationality, place of residence and any
links he or she may have with the Parties’ countries of origin.”141 In correspondence with the author, an eResolution representative confirmed that where the complainant and respondent reside in different jurisdictions, eResolution endeavors to
assign a panelist from a neutral third country.142
Examining information that can be easily extracted from
UDRP case search facilities maintained by ICANN and the
providers are also of little help in shedding light into panelist
allocation. The current search functionality is very limited,
with the database searchable primarily by case name. Moreover, culling information directly from the cases is time consuming since UDRP decisions are not consistently reported.
The lack of transparency on issues such as panelist allocation
is particularly worrisome since the data suggests that there is
a significant difference in outcome when panelists are allocated
exclusively by the provider in a single-member panelist case
and when both parties influence the composition of the panel,
139. Id. § 6(b).
140. See NAF RULES § 9; E RESOLUTION RULES ¶ 8; WIPO, at
www.wipo.int/index.html.en (last visited Apr. 20, 2002).
141. E RESOLUTION RULES § 8(i).
142. E-mail from Joëlle Thibault, Vice President, Professional Services,
eResolution, to Michael Geist, Associate Professor, University of Ottawa,
Faculty of Law (Aug. 1, 2001, 09:19:08 EST) (on file with Journal) [hereinafter Thibault E-mail]. A review of eResolution’s case allocation confirms that
this is the typical practice. Through July 7, 2001, there were sixty eResolution single panel cases involving parties from different jurisdictions. In fiftyfive of those cases, the single panelist was a resident of neither the complainant’s nor the respondent’s jurisdiction. Although not explicitly provided in its
rules, it would appear that a similar policy is followed by WIPO. A review of
its caseload of single-member panel cases involving parties from different
jurisdictions yielded 784 cases, of which 736 involved a single panelist who
was not a resident of either the complainant’s or the respondent’s jurisdiction.
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as in a three-member panelist case.143 Furthermore, with a
growing number of panelists cross-listed on two or more provider rosters, differences in outcomes between providers cannot
be easily attributed to the different composition of the provider
rosters.
A review of the 3881 single-member panel cases as of February 18, 2002 indicates that single panel cases may not be allocated in an entirely random manner.144 Most disturbing are
the case allocation trends at the NAF. Of the NAF’s 1379 single-member panel cases, only six panelists decided an astonishing 56.4% (778 of 1379) of the cases.145 The sheer number of
cases assigned to only six people alone is surprising. The 778
cases represent 20% of the entire UDRP single panelist
caseload.146
The NAF caseload allocation data is particularly noteworthy
since it stands in stark contrast to the other providers, whose
numbers are nearly identical. The six busiest single-member
panelists at WIPO account for 17.1% of the WIPO single panelist caseload, while the six busiest single panel panelists at
eResolution account for 20.5% of their total caseload.147 Although WIPO’s overall caseload is considerably larger than the
NAF’s, the raw numbers still indicate a significant difference.
The 17.1% caseload at WIPO represents a total of 385 cases,
just under half of the NAF total of 778.148
More troubling than the NAF caseload data alone is the fact
that complainants have won 95.1% of those cases.149 This figure is remarkably higher than virtually any other point of
comparison, including overall complainant winning percentage
or complainant winning percentage by provider. Moreover,
when contrasted with 46% complainant win rate in NAF threemember panel cases, the impact of provider panelist selection
becomes glaringly apparent.
143. Geist-Database, supra note 30.
144. Id.
145. Id. The six panelists, in order of caseload, are: James A. Carmody,
Carolyn Marks Johnson, James P. Buchele, Ralph Yachnin, Harold Kalina
and John J. Upchurch. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Geist-Database, supra note 30. With its smaller caseload, the comparable eResolution total is only forty-seven cases.
149. Id.
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The large number of default cases decided by NAF’s six busiest panelists might admittedly be partially responsible for
skewing the complainant win percentage upward. Default
cases, do not, however, explain the failure to randomly allocate
caseload because the vast majority of the NAF panelists hear
default cases. Since the majority of the NAF panelists are willing to decide default cases, random case allocation would suggest that the caseloads should be distributed more evenly.
Moreover, the default track records of some of NAF’s busiest
panelists might lead observers to conclude that the ICANN
UDRP has reversed the traditional maxim of innocent until
proven guilty. The Honorable Carolyn Marks Johnson, James
P. Buchele and Harold Kalina have never ruled in favor of a
respondent in a default case, with complainants winning 324 of
324 cases between the three panelists.150 Not far behind sit
Ralph Yachnin and John J. Upchurch, who have a combined
complainant win record in default cases of 184 in 187 cases.151
The NAF caseload data is not the only example of UDRP
panel selection bias. A second source of data is a review of
which panelists have never been selected for single panel duty.
There are thirty-one such panelists, who have participated in
at least one UDRP case, but never as a single panelist.152
Nearly 60% of the panelists (eighteen of thirty-one) have only
participated in one UDRP case and therefore have no track record.153 WIPO’s panelist roster contains two panelists who
stand out, however.
G. Gervaise Davis III, a California attorney, and Professor
Milton Mueller of Syracuse University, the author of the UDRP
study, Rough Justice: An Analysis of ICANN’s Dispute Resolution Policy,154 have together participated in a total of forty
cases, yet neither has ever participated as a sole panelist.155
That Davis and Mueller would be popular among respondents
seeking a panelist for a three-member panel comes as little
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. M UELLER, supra note 8.
155. Professor A. Michael Froomkin, a well-known ICANN critic, has also
participated in twelve UDRP cases, though never as a single panelist. Professor Froomkin was featured on the eResolution panelist roster.
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surprise. The complainant has won only nine of the twentyfour cases in which Davis has appeared as a panelist.156 Similarly, the complainant has won only four of the sixteen cases in
which Mueller has appeared as a panelist.157
Given their records, it seems unlikely that a complainant
would select either panelist if given a choice. Assuming random caseload allocation, however, it also seems unlikely that
among the 2565 WIPO single panel cases, neither Davis nor
Mueller’s name would surface even once. In fact, a review of
all WIPO panelists that have decided five or more singlemember panel cases (and thus have a track record) provides
further evidence that this omission is not mere happenstance.
There have been 121 panelists selected by WIPO five or more
times to decide single-member panel cases — all 121 panelists
have a complai nant win percentage that is higher than that of
Davis or Mueller and that is at least 50%.158
IV. UDRP REFORM RECOMMENDATIONS
A. Mandatory Three-Member Panels
Calls for reform to the UDRP have been voiced since its inception. Concerns regarding forum shopping have cast doubt
on the fairness of the process. A plethora of inconsistent and
clearly incorrect decisions have left both trademark holders
and domain name registrants alike uncomfortable with the uncertainty of the process. Add to these concerns the suggestion
of provider bias in the determination of who decides what case.
Professor Mueller raised several possibilities for reform in
Rough Justice, including random selection of panelists, the development of an appellate process and a greater tie between
provider and registrar.159 Random selection was seen as problematic since it might eliminate a competitive provider environment and leave ICANN with a much larger dispute resolution regulatory function than is presently the case.160 Although
the appellate process might reduce the number of bad decisions, Mueller points out that it is also likely to delay the reso156.
157.
158.
159.
160.

Geist-Database, supra note 30.
Id.
Id.
See M UELLER, supra note 8, at pt. 4.
See id.
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lution of domain name disputes and render the process more
like global law than a form of alternative dispute resolution.161
Professor Mueller ultimately favored a registrar selection
process, in which registrars would contract with one or more
accredited dispute resolution providers to handle all the disputes raised by their registrations.162 Under this system, the
complainant would no longer select the provider, yet a competitive provider system would remain in place.163 Alternative suggestions have included a new ICANN accreditation scheme
that would accredit panelists rather than providers,164 the use
of juries to resolve disputes165 and respondent selection of provider.166
This Article suggests that although each of these proposals
for reform may have a positive effect on the problematic aspects of the UDRP, they ultimately will not address the root of
the problem. Rather than focusing on provider selection as a
means of solving the forum shopping issue, ICANN must turn
its attention to panelist selection. If providers continue to
maintain exclusive and unchecked authority over the selection
of panelists in 90% of all UDRP cases, no reforms to the rules
or how a provider is selected will remove the potential for bias
in panelist allocation. The author submits that the solution to
the forum shopping issue, and with it the concerns about bias
and inconsistency within the UDRP, is surprisingly simple —
all contested UDRP actions should involve three-member panels. Establishing the three-member panel as the default would
remove most provider influence over panelist selection and ensure better quality decisions by forcing panelists to justify their
reasoning to their colleagues on the panel. As with the current
system, both parties would play a role in selecting one panelist,
who may be part of any ICANN-accredited provider’s roster,

161. See id.
162. See id.
163. See id.
164. See John Berryhill, The UDRP Provides Disputable Resolution Incentives, at http://www.icannwatch.org/archive/udrp_and_incentives.htm (Apr. 4,
2000).
165. See D. G. Post, Juries and the UDRP, at http://www.icannwatch.org/
archive/juries_and_the_udrp.htm (Sept. 6, 2000).
166. See Rose Communications, S.L., Domain Name Dispute Procedure and
Related Issues, at http://www.rose.es/udrpenglish.htm (May 2001).
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while the provider would select the third panelist from among a
list that both parties have reviewed and accepted.
The dramatic difference in single versus three-member panel
outcomes should not be viewed as shifting the balance toward
domain name registrants, but rather as shifting the balance
toward greater fairness. Although analysts have argued over
what the right complainant win percentage ought to be, the
60% complainant win rate in three-member panels indicates
that the best considered decisions place the percentage much
lower than the current overall rate of 82%.167
Unlike the current system, the complainant would be required to cover the full cost of the three-member panel. Although this requirement will double the cost of a UDRP action
for many complainants, the cost will remain low in comparison
with traditional litigation. Moreover, the fact that complai nants already select a three-member panel more frequently than
do respondents indicates that concern over the quality of decisions is currently an issue for both trademark holders and domain name registrants. Provider caseloads also indicate that
complainants are relatively cost-insensitive since WIPO, the
most expensive of the three main providers, enjoys a commanding 59% share of all UDRP cases.168
One further method of reducing complainant costs would be
to combine the mandatory three-member panel rule for contested cases with the NAF Supplemental Rule on respondent
defaults.169 That rule allows a complainant to move from a
three-member panel to a single panelist where the respondent
fails to provide a response.170 In doing so, the complainant is
refunded the difference in cost between a single-member and
three-member panel.171 Adopting that supplemental rule
would allow complainants to reduce their costs during default
cases, while maintaining the benefits of three-member panels
for contested cases.
Forcing complainants to shoulder the full cost of a threemember panel should not be regarded as providing respondents
with a free ride. The costs inherent in launching or defending
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.

See Geist-Database, supra note 30.
Id.
See NAF RULES § 9(c).
Id. § (i).
Id. § 9(c)(iv).
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a UDRP action extend well beyond the provider fees. Legal
and administrative costs can be several times as much as the
provider fee, and the current rules do not contain any provision
for costs. Accordingly, defending a UDRP action remains an
expensive proposition for all registrants, even if the requirement to contribute to the cost of a three-member panel is
eliminated.
Interestingly, this approach has met with approval at the
country code TLD level. In November 2001, the Canadian
Internet Registration Authority (“CIRA”), which administers
the “.ca” domain, approved the Canadian Domain Name Resolution Policy (“CDRP”).172 Although the CDRP is modeled after
the ICANN UDRP, it differs in several material respects. Most
important for the current purposes, the CIRA Domain Name
Dispute Resolution Rules, which govern the CDRP, provide that
all contested cases will be decided by three-member panels to
be paid for by the complainant.173 Where the respondent fails
to respond, the complainant has the option of requesting a less
costly one-person panel.174
B. Caseload Minimums and Maximums
Several additional smaller reforms may prove effective in
conjunction with the adoption of the three-member panel as the
standard approach. The establishment of caseload minimums
and maximums would help ensure that this study’s findings —
huge caseloads assigned to a small number of panelists as well
as the failure to select some panelists for dispute resolution
duty — are eliminated.
If all contested UDRP cases featured three-member panels,
chosen, by and large, by the complainant and respondent, providers would be unable to ensure that panelists met either
caseload minimums or maximums. However, providers will
still play a role in naming the panel’s third panelist as well as
in respondent default cases that revert to a single panelist.
172. See CIRA, at http://www.cira.ca/en/home.html (last visited Apr. 20,
2002). In the interests of full disclosure, it should be noted that the author is
an elected member of CIRA’s board of directors.
173. CIRA, CIRA DOMAIN NAME DISPUTE RESOLUTION RULES ¶ 6.4 (2001),
available at http://www.cira.ca/officialdoc/96.rules_final_November_29_2001
_en.pdf.
174. Id. ¶ 6.5.
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Accordingly, it would be beneficial to create new limits that
ensure that all panelists are afforded the opportunity to preside over a roughly equivalent number of cases and that no
panelist gets too many cases. The minimum cases would likely
be expressed by a raw number, perhaps no less than three
cases per year. The maximum caseload would likely be expressed as a percentage, perhaps no more than 3% of a provider’s total caseload. Establishing these caseload minimums
and maximums would reduce provider influence over panelist
selection, increase the assurance of random case allocation and
enhance the public perception of the UDRP’s fairness.
C. New Quality Control Mechanisms
Although eResolution did not publicize the fact on its website, it engaged in an annual quality control review of its panelists.175 In 2000, ten panelists were removed from its roster due
to quality control problems such as unreasonable delays in the
release of decisions or failures to abide by the ICANN Rules.176
Similar quality control mechanisms should become standard at
all ICANN-accredited providers. Complainants and respondents alike will agree that the quality of individual panelists
varies greatly. While this is not unexpected, all providers
should play an active role in seeking to ensure that only the
best panelists participate in the UDRP. The annual reviews
should be conducted in public, with solicitations of comments
from the public and the public release of those persons removed
from each provider’s roster.
D. Greater Transparency
One of the greatest challenges in conducting this study was
the lack of readily available data. Although all UDRP cases
are posted and freely available, case reports vary in quality
since there is no standard approach. Moreover, the current
search functionality on both the ICANN and provider sites lack
the functionality necessary to search by panelist and panel
type — two critical considerations. As a result of this shortcoming, the author intends to post the data collected during
175. See Thibault E-mail, supra note 142.
176. Id.
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this study on a publicly available website.177 In addition, the
UDRP Publishing Protocol Project, hosted by Cornell Law
School, plans to support the development of greater reporting
standards.178 ICANN, in conjunction with the providers,
should make the availability of greater and more useful UDRP
data a priority. Increased transparency in the entire process,
from panelist selection to decision-making process, will only
enhance public confidence in the system.
V. CONCLUSION
The Domain Name Supporting Organization Names Council
engaged in a study of the ICANN UDRP, though the future of
that study was in doubt as of April 2002, due to an initiative to
reform ICANN’s governance structure.179 Part II of this Article, which reviewed the development of a domain name dispute
resolution policy dating back to the initial NSI policies in the
mid-1990’s, illustrates that policies have changed with surprising regularity as practical experience identifies the need for
reform.180 ICANN must not shy away from reforming the domain name dispute resolution policy yet again.
This study provides compelling evidence that forum shopping
has become an integral part of the UDRP and that the system
may indeed be biased in favor of trademark holders. Both
WIPO and the NAF, the two dominant ICANN-accredited arbitration providers, feature case allocation data that suggests
that the panelist selection process is not random. Rather, it
appears to be heavily biased toward ensuring that a majority of
cases are steered toward complainant-friendly panelists.
Moreover, the data shows that there is a correlation between
177. See Geist-Database, supra note 30.
178. See Cornell Law School, Index of /udrp, at http://udrp.law.cornell.edu/
udrp (last visited Apr. 20, 2002).
179. See Domain Name Supporting Organization of ICANN, UDRP Review
and Evaluation, Terms of Reference, at http://www.dnso.org/dnso/
notes/2001.NC-tor-UDRP-Review-Evaluation.v1.html (amended with the NC
motion voted on Aug. 11, 2001) (last visited Apr. 20, 2002).
180. See A. Michael Froomkin, Wrong Turn in Cyberspace: Using ICANN to
Route Around the APA and the Constitution, 50 DUKE L.J. 17, 58-59 (2000)
(“NSI’s control over the mechanics of registration allowed it to, and perhaps
even operationally required it to, make decisions that had policy implications.
The most controversial of these was undoubtedly NSI’s frequently amended
‘dispute policy.’”).
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provider panelist selection and case outcome. When providers
control who decides a case, as they do for all single panel cases,
complainants win just over 83% of the time.181 As provider influence over panelists diminishes, as occurs in three-member
panel cases, the complainant winning percentage drops to
60%.182
The solution to the forum shopping and bias issues may be
relatively simple — the adoption of the three-member panel as
the default approach. When combined with protective measures such as caseload minimums and maximums, transparent
quality control mechanisms and greater accountability through
standardized disclosure, the reforms would succeed in instilling
greater confidence and fairness in the UDRP.

181. Geist-Database, supra note 30.
182. Id.
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ANNEX A
PANELISTS LISTED WITH MORE THAN ONE PROVIDER
(As of July 31, 2001)
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.

PANELIST
Bansal, Ashwanie Kumar
Bernstein, David H.
Bianchi, Roberto A.
Bridgeman, James Jude
Carson, Ross
Chiasson, Edward C.
Christie, Andrew
Creel, Thomas L.
DeCicco, Paul Michael
Diaz, Hon. Nelson A.
Doi, Teruo
Donahey, M. Scott
Elliott, Clive Lincoln
Fashler, Robert A.
Gabay, Mayer
Gulliksson, Jonas
Haviland, Dana
Hill, Richard
Hudis, Jonathan
Introvigne, Dr. Massimo
Iteanu, Olivier
Jayaram, Hariram
Kaufman, Jeffrey H.
Kim, Young
Knopf, Howard P.
Kyle, Rodney C.
Lametti, David
Le Stanc, Christian
Lee, Moon Sung
Leger, Jacques A.
Leonardos, Gabriel

NAF
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
–
Yes
–
–
Yes
Yes
–
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
–
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
–
Yes
–
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

eRes
–
–
–
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
–
Yes
–
Yes
Yes
–
Yes
–
–
Yes
Yes
–
–
–
–
–
–
Yes
Yes
Yes
–
–
Yes
Yes

CPR
–
Yes
–
–
–
Yes
–
Yes
–
Yes
–
Yes
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–

WIPO
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
–
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
–
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
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32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.

BROOK. J. INT’L L.
PANELIST
Francisco
Li, Yong
Limbury, Alan Lawrence
Lisman, Natasha C.
Lowry, Houston Putnam
Machado, Eduardo
Maga lhaes
Mason, Paul E.
Methvin, Gaynell C.
Michaelson, Peter L.
Mille, Antonio
Ophir, Michael
Osborne, Dawn
Perritt, Henry
Pimenta, Luiz Edgard
Montaury
Plant, David
Richard, Hugues G.
Samuels, Jeffrey M.
Schanda, Reinhard
Sellers, Sandra A.
Semuyaba, Justine
Singh, Maninder
Sol Muntanola, Mario A.
Swinson, John V.
Szamosi, Dr. Katalin
Thompson, Roderick M.
Triana, Fernando
Turner, Jonathan DC
Ulmer, Nicolas Courtland
Upchurch, Hon. John J.
Wallace, Anne M.
Wallberg, Knud
Weinstein, Jordan
Woo, Jisuk
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NAF
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CPR

WIPO
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–
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